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nouvelle republique seroit le prix du secours que le Roy leur auroit accordé. Ce sont des choses à voir avec leurs agents à Paris. J'ignore s'ils sont autorisés à faire des propositions ou s'ils en ont faites. Je ne serois pas fâché que vous voulussiez faire lire ma lettre à M. le C^{te}. de Broglie; il en scait beaucoup sur ces matières là, il verroit ce que je ne puis pas voir, en parleroit à qui il conviendrait. Si ensuite on vouloit me donner des instructions circonstanciés avec les pouvoirs d'en conferer avec le Congrès, je m'en chargerois volontiers mais les lettres sont si longtems à aller et venir et si peu sûres d'arriver que les affaires ne pourroient que beaucoup souffrir par là. Tout ce que je vous dis, m'est dicté par le zele qui j'ay pour le service de mon maitre,¹³ et pour la juste cause de ce Pays cy. Vous en ferez l'usage que vous jugerez à propos.

J'ay l'honneur d'etre avec le plus sincere et le plus parfait attachement, Monsieur, votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur

LE BON DE KALB

P. S. Si le Roy avoit dessein de faire la guerre, ou pourroit au moment ou avant de la declarer faire enlever les 5700 hommes en question, Lorsqu'ils seront renvoyés en Angleterre. leur depart d'icy ne peut pas être très prochain. Je vous le manderay aussytot qui je pourray en etre informé, aussy de leur escorte.

*2. Letter of the Marquis of Rockingham respecting Defense
against John Paul Jones, 1779.*

THIS letter, for which we are indebted to Professor Charles M. Andrews, was addressed to Lord Weymouth as secretary of state. A letter of Lord Rockingham to the marchioness, September 23, 1779, printed in Albemarle's *Rockingham*, II. 381-383, covers in part the same ground, but the present letter is fuller, and dwells less on the personal and more on the public aspects of the affair. It exhibits well the alarm caused by Jones's exploits. Rockingham had been vice-admiral of Yorkshire from 1755 to his dismissal in 1763, and again, under his present appointment, since December, 1776; he had been high steward of Hull since 1766. The original letter is in the Public Record Office, in State Papers Domestic, Military (Militia), vol. 33.

My Lord

I received an Account from Hull on Wednesday Night; stating the Alarm they were in from the Appearance of Paul Jones and his Squadron off the Mouth of the Humber and also representing the defenceless State in which the Gentlemen and Merchts of Hull considered the Town

¹³ The Count de Broglie, to whom Kalb was *aide-maréchal des logis*. His project for being made "stadtholder" of the United States, and Kalb's position and course in relation to this intrigue, are sufficiently set forth by Kapp, and by Dr. Stillé in the *Pennsylvania Magazine of History*, vol. IX. "Si je repars pour l'Europe c'est en grande partie parcequ'il y a impossibilité de faire reussir le grand projet dont je me suis occuppé avec tant de plaisir"; Kalb to Broglie, October 11, 1777, cipher letter in Stevens, *Facsimiles*, no. 755.

and Shipping. The Honour which his Majesty conferr'd upon me in appointing me Vice Admiral of the Maritime Ports of the County of York, has indeed no Power nor any duty, and my Object in taking it in the late Kings Time, was to prevent its falling into Hands who might trouble and incommode many Gentlemen on the Coast—by reviving old Obsolete Claims of Rights in regard to Wrecks on the Coast etc. etc. The Town and Corporation of Hull several Years ago had done me the Honour to appoint me—to a Nominal Office—of High Steward of Hull. Tho' no real Power was placed in me, yet the very Imagination that such High Offices did contain Power, appeared to me, to give a Sort of Weight to me, which might possibly be of Some Service. I therefore set out for Hull as early as I could on Thursday Morning and arrived there that Night.

Two Gentlemen from Hull had been dispatched from thence on Wednesday Night, by whom Your Lordship and his Majesty's Ministers will have been fully informed of the State in which the Gentlemen, Merchts, Trinity House, and inhabitants considered their Town and Shipping.

The Mayor called a general Meeting on Friday Morning in consequence of my coming. They informed me of the Steps they had taken and desired me to Suggest what I might think adviseable. I shall not conceal from Your Lordship, that I expressed very strongly my thoughts, that the Safety and Security of the Town and Port of Hull had been long neglected. I shall not hesitate to say, that from an Attack by Frigates or Ships of War, it was entirely without defence: the Artillery *in the Fort*—its *only defence*—were unserviceable both from the Carriages being entirely rotten, and also from most of the Guns which carried any Weight of Metal being honeycombed and dangerous to Use. New Carriages had been order'd for some of the Cannon, but they were at Woolwich to be ironed, and indeed if they had been at Hull, very few of the 18 Pounders and 9 Pounders could have been mounted on them, as Those Cannon were so universally reckoned unserviceable and dangerous, even tho' some of them had on a late Report been deemed still capable of Use.

A Ship of 60 Guns can lay, *even at low Water*, within less than 400 Yards of the Town. In Paul Jones's Squadron the largest Vessel was a 40 Gun Ship, so that whatever Force he had could have come up.

It appeared to me, that not only from the Information of a Man who had been put by Paul Jones into a prize and who had assisted very principally in securing the men and bringing her in with the Assistance of a Hull Pilot, but also from the Size and Number of Ships in Paul Jones's Squadron, that there could not be any Number of Soldiers or Marines on Board the Squadron, or that with what Seamen he could have spared from the Ships, that any considerable Force could be landed by Paul Jones, which the Yorkshire Reg^t of Militia under Col: Harvey would not be as able, as they were willing and desirous to repell. Part of the Northumberland Militia were also at Beverley and the Neighbourhood, so that on any attack on Shore from Paul Jones's present Force, I did not conceive much danger to the Town and Port and Shipping of Hull could ensue. I conceived very differently in regard to an attempt being made by the Squadron coming up Humber. I therefore pressed as much as I possibly could that every Effort should be made to prepare Batteries and get what Artillery could be had. I

must observe to Your Lordship that at the Meeting on Friday Morning, Intelligence came, that the *Serapis* and the Countess of Scarborough had been seen shortening sail, covering the Baltic Fleet and waiting for Paul Jones, who was then very near to them. A later Intelligence also informed us, that the *Serapis* and the Countess were seen to tack and to stand to meet Paul Jones and his Squadron and that the Engagement was begun, but it growing dark—the Event of a very Warm Action was not known. Great Hopes were entertained—Great Confidence in the Ability and Valour of Capt Pearson of the *Serapis* and of Capt Percy of the Countess of Scarborough—the *Serapis* was a 44 Gun Frigate, the Countess of Scarborough one of the Armed Vessels hired, carrying 20 Guns, but in fact not capable of making Use of more than *Five* Guns on a Side.

The Unfortunate Event of their being Captured after a most Severe Engagement, came to our Knowledge at Hull on the Friday Evening, when the Mayor immediately called a Meeting, and at which the Proposition of preparing Batteries was unanimously adopted.

I was informed that a Vessel was detained in the Port of Hull on the Appearance of Paul Jones's Squadron, on which there was, 20 Eighteen Pounders, Some 12 Pounders and a few 9 Pounders, which were cast at the Foundary near Rotherham and were going according to Orders from the Ordnance to Woolwich. I ventured to Suggest and to press that the 20 Eighteen Pounders particularly should be required to be landed, and that Carriages should immediately be prepared for them. It was assented to by the Meeting, but if the Stopping of them was wrong, I must beg that it may be consider'd as entirely my Act. It was said at first, that it would require Seven or Ten days to make Serviceable Carriages for them, but in less than half an Hour, Two of the Capital Block Makers in Hull came to us at the Meeting, and contracted to deliver the 20 Carriages, by *Nine oClock* on the next day's (Saturday) Evening. I had the Satisfaction to see Several of these Carriages *ready for Use* by 12 oClock on the Saturday Morning, and the whole I believe was or would have been completed within the Time. The Guns were taken out of the Ships Hold on the Saturday Morning and some of them mounted and carried to the Artillery Ground where there formerly had been a Battery, and which in a few Hours would have been ready for Use. a Battery on one of the Curtains in the Garrison was also making ready for these New Guns.

The Account which was received at Hull on Saturday Evening, that Paul Jones's Squadron was seen standing off the Coast and supposed with the Intention to go to Gottenburgh, as a very fresh Wind served him, occasioned some Slackness in accelerating the Works, but I have nevertheless Hopes that they were completed Yesterday Evening, and I must Hope and earnestly recommend, that not only the above Preparations should continue, but that also Batteries at Marfleet and at Pauls¹ should immediately be ordered. The Batteries formed by the new Guns would have been served by the Sea Captains and Seamen of the Port of Hull, with the Assistance of Capt. O'hara, the regulating Capt: and who in every respect was ready to be of all possible Assistance. Col Morris and Capt Terrot of the Garrison were also equally ready, and the Gentlemen and Merch^{ts} and Inhabitants of Hull were quite Alert, and pleased with the thoughts of some better Hope and Mode

¹ Both places are on the north side of the Humber, a few miles below Hull.

of Defence than had at first appeared. One Gentlemen, Mr Standridge, had offered on Friday Morning to erect and command and Serve with the Seamen belonging to his Vessels, a Battery which he would erect at his own Expence, and on which some of the Hull Ships Guns should be mounted. I understand there are in Hull many Ship Guns, but being in general only 3 Pounds, they would not have been of much avail. Mr. Standridges Proposition was negatived on the Friday Morning, but probably would have been afterwards adopted.

Some Gentlemen at the Meeting thought, that the assent of Govt: was necessary. I did not press the Matter at that Time, but desired Leave to offer to make a Present to the Town, of Some 18 Pounds, providing it met with his Majesty's Approbation, and which Guns I proposed should always be looked on as belonging to the Town and Corporation, to be manned and Served by their own People, and formed into a Battery either at Marfleet or at Pauls.

I must therefore desire Your Lordship to lay this my humble Request before his Majesty, and it will make me happy to hear that his Majesty would graciously permit it, as I think that it would give Pleasure to the Town to have a Battery in any degree respectable, and which I doubt not would be well served, whenever the Occasion of an Enemy Fleet made an Attempt to come up Humber.

I have wrote a Letter to L^d Amherst,² and shall again shortly trouble his Lordship in regard to a Battery at Marfleet and at Pauls. Marfleet is within Two Miles of the Garrison, and would therefore be easily protected from any Attempt by Land, from the Assistance which the Reg^t in Hull could give it. At Pauls it would require *something of a Fort* and Battery as it is Ten Miles from Hull, but my Lord, tho' I see the absolute Necessity of securing the Port of Hull, agt the Attack of Frigates etc. by Sea, Yet I should not call upon Government for a large Expence in the Situation of the Finances of this Country. A *Few* thousands expended, would afford much Security to that Important Port.

Ever since the Year 1759, when I was there, I have always conceived that Batteries at *Pauls* and at Marfleet were necessary. At present it is become still much more Necessary, as this Country has so many Enemies by Sea, and has not a Naval adequate to the Security and Protection of Every Part of the Coast, at *all Times*.

The Report of Paul Jones's Squadron which was received on Saturday Evening, was fully confirmed on Sunday. I had the Pleasure also to hear that in the Night a Frigate of 36 Guns, one of 28 the Cerberus, and an Armed Ship of 40 Guns and three Sloops of 16 Guns Each had passed Spurn head standing to the Northward. It is possible they may overtake Jones's Squadron, as both his own Ship and the Serapis were so mauled as that they can scarce make much Way. There is also another Circumstance which may retard him, as he probably in his Course to Gottenburgh may fall in with our Second Baltick Fleet which was to sail in Six days, after that Fleet which is just arrived. It is happy that our Frigates may be so soon after him, as it may tend to save the 2d Baltick Fleet which is of Even larger Value than the one which is Arrived. I must nevertheless add, that by the Account of Five men who escaped in a Boat from Paul Jones's Ship, when they were shifting the Prisoners after the Action, the

² Commander-in-chief of the army.

Squadron under Paul Jones is not far inferior in Force to the Frigates etc. which are in pursuit of him. If Paul Jones should escape and get to Harbour and refit his Ships, He will be of considerable Force, and I should imagine the Eclat of his having taken the Serapis would occasion the French to place more and more Confidence in him, and he may be entrusted by them with a much more formidable Force, than that with which he has lately appeared.

In that View I should hope and humbly reccomend that this Northern Coast should be protected by Ships at Sea, and that no practicable Precautions should be omitted at Land.

May I beg that Your Lordship will state the particulars of this Letter, in the most respectful and dutiful Manner, to his Majesty. If I presumed too much in Stopping the Cannon, I humbly hope his Majesty will be graciously pleased not to disapprove it. If in any other Transaction in this Business, I have taken upon me more than I ought, I must hope and trust that his Majesty will put the most favorable Construction.

I have the Honour to be

My Lord

With great Regard

Your Lordships

Most Obedt and Most Humble

Serv^t

ROCKINGHAM

WENTWORTH

Tuesday M:

Sept. 28th 1779

Paul Jones's Squadron being gone and no further Business appearing for me at Hull, I set out late on Sunday Evening and got here on Monday.

[Endorsed] Wentworth 28 Sept 1779

Marq^s of Rockingham

R 1st October

one inclosure.

[On a half sheet of paper accompanying the foregoing is]:

By the Account from the Men who left Paul Jones's Ship After the Action and who landed at Bridlington—

N B this Account came from Mr. Foster Saturday Night	Sept: 2d,
Bon Homme Richard..Paul Jones	40 Guns
Alliance.....Lundy ³	36 Do.
Pallas.....(Coutinea ⁴ by Walker Acct.).	32 Do.
Monsieur	36 Do.
Vengeance Brig.....	12 Do.
Granville	12 Do.
Cutter	18 Do.

Endorsed In Lord Rockingham's

28 Sept 1779.

³ Landais.

⁴ Cottineau.

3. *Letter of John Quincy Adams, from Ghent, 1814.*

THE original of the following letter, for a copy of which we are indebted to Mr. H. E. Lawrence, jr., of Yale University, is possessed by Mr. John V. Bacot of Morristown, New Jersey, a descendant of the person to whom it is addressed. Its interest lies chiefly in its spirited statement of the author's position at one of the darkest periods of the peace negotiations at Ghent.¹ Another element of interest lies in the evidence of friendly remembrance of those Americans who had been the writer's schoolmates at Passy in 1778, during his father's first mission to Europe—Cochran, a South Carolina boy, Jesse Deane, son of Silas Deane, and Benjamin Franklin Bache, Franklin's grandson.² Though the course of the latter as editor of the *Aurora* produced a complete alienation, the *Memoirs* show Deane as held in kindly regard in 1827: "I told him [Professor Richard Henry Lee the biographer] of my meeting Jesse Deane in 1824, and that I should be sorry at the publication of anything that would wound his feelings in regard to his father."³

Ch^s. B. Cochran Esq^r Charleston

GHEENT 18. July 1814.

Dear Sir.

Just at the moment when I was embarking at Boston for Russia in 1809, I had the pleasure of receiving a Letter from you, by one of your friends, and strongly regretted that my immediate departure deprived me of the opportunity of acknowledging your favour, and of marking by any attentions or services which it might have been in my power to render to the Gentleman who was the bearer of your Recommendation, my value for your friendship, and my remembrance of our intimacy, formed at an age when every sentiment is equally vivid and sincere, and when the heart is naturally led to seek those attachments which are to last through life.

On my arrival at Gothenburg a few weeks since, from Russia, Lieutenant Bacot delivered to me your obliging favour of 11. March last. I had the pleasure of coming in the Ship in Company with that young Gentleman from that City to the Texel, and his return to the United States now furnishes me the occasion of thanking you for your Letters, and of recalling myself again to your Recollection.

During my residence at St. Petersburg, I have had the good fortune to meet two of our old fellow-pensioners at Le Coeur's school. One of them was Mr. David, one of two brothers, the children of French Parents, who at that time resided in London, and who had sent those two sons over to Passy to be educated in their native Country. A few years after that period, and as soon as Mr David had attained the age of Manhood he went over to America, and for nearly thirty years

¹ See Adams's *Memoirs*, II. 659, under date of July 18, 1814, and Crawford's letter to Clay, dated July 19, in Clay's *Works*, IV. 42.

² See *Works of John Adams*, III. 96, 97.

³ *Memoirs*, VI. 419; VII. 245.

has generally resided at Philadelphia. He went to Russia, with a vessel and Cargo, principally belonging to himself, and which were unfortunately lost on their return to America. I saw him often while he was at St. Petersburg and he bore among our Countrymen there, universally the Reputation of an honourable and benevolent man.

The other was an Engineer Officer in the Russian Service. His name was *Rudolphe*. I had the opportunity of seeing him only once, in the year 1810, and I have not heard of him since. I know not how it happened, but I did not recollect either his name or his person. His memory had been more faithful; for although he did not recognize my person, he remembered my name, and those of both our American Schoolmates Bache and Deane; and particularly you, about whom he enquired with so much interest, that I think his acquaintance with you must have been longer and more familiar, than with me; it has not been without some self-reproof that I have found it possible that I should have forgotten any one of our school-fellows at Passy.⁴

The object upon which I was in the first instance directed to repair to Gothenburg, and for which, by a subsequent proposal from the British Government, and assented to by my Colleagues, I am with them in this City, is as you justly observe of a Nature to engage the wishes of every true American, and the patriotic exertions of every person entrusted with a charge so highly important to the Community. Peace upon Honorable Terms, would be a blessing of such inestimable value to our Country, that I trust that neither myself nor any one of my Colleagues would deem his life or mine a sacrifice too great to obtain it. We have unfortunately too much reason for the conviction that it is utterly unattainable; and I am happy to find in your Letter, what my knowledge of your character would indeed not have permitted me to doubt, that in your mind, Peace, upon any other than honourable terms is not an object upon which my Colleagues or I were suitable persons to be employed, or upon which the Government of the United States was prepared to employ any person. Dearly as I value Peace, and much as I know it is needed and desired by our Country, I pledge myself to you that you shall never see my name to a Treaty, no, nor to any one stipulation that shall give you cause to blush for your Country or for your friend. Yet at the same time I must admit that with this Disposition, Peace at the present moment, and I fear for a long time to come, is absolutely hopeless. Whatever the disposition of the British Government may have been at the time even when they proposed the negotiation at Gothenburg, the change of Circumstances since that time, has undoubtedly made the continuance of the War with America, a purpose of policy with them, as much as it is a purpose of Passion with their Nation. I have not myself recently been in England; but two of my Colleagues have, and their opinions coincide with the whole mass of Evidence manifested by the public Prints of that Country, by the Debates in their Parliament, and by the Acts of their Government

⁴ [June 9, 1810.] "This evening I met . . . a Monsieur Rudolphe, a Frenchman, who told me that he had been with me at Mr. Le Coeur's school at Passy, in 1778, and enquired of our other American schoolmates of that date—Cochran, Franklin Bache, and Deane. I have no doubt that this gentleman's memory has been more retentive than mine; for I have no recollection of him, nor indeed of any one name among Mr. Le Coeur's French scholars, though I well remembered all the Americans." *Memoirs*, II. 133.

as far as they are known to us, that they are resolved to make no Peace with us at present, and none at any time but such an one, as may gratify their jealousy in the reduction of our Power; their Revenge in our Humiliation, and their Pride in our Disgrace. They have kept us waiting nearly four Months since the arrival of Mr. Clay and Mr. Russell in Europe, and their Commissioners are not yet here to meet us; in the mean time they have sent to America formidable reinforcements both of their Navy and Army, to subdue the Spirit of our Country by the terror of their Arms, and I can imagine no other motive for their studied and long protracted delays to the Commencement of the Negotiation, than the intention of waiting for the effect of their forces upon our fears. Whatever they may do, I trust in God that they will find in our Country a Spirit adequate to every exigency; and that the same blood which warmed the hearts of our fathers to resist and triumph over their tyranny, will be found still flowing in our own veins and in those of our children.

I am with great Respect, Dear Sir, your friend and very humble Servt.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

4. Letter of William Henry Trescot on Reconstruction in South Carolina, 1867.

WILLIAM HENRY TRESBOT of South Carolina (for whose position in 1860-1861 see an earlier volume of the REVIEW, XIII. 528-556) was by nature a moderate man, dispassionate, and capable of taking an external view of the events which went on around him. Thus in 1867 he was well adapted to playing the part of a mediator. It is possible that Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, when in the spring of that year he visited South Carolina in the course of a tour of the Southern states, had some conference with Trescot. At all events, it is plain from the following letter that he invited suggestions from Trescot, by a letter of September 1, to which the following is a reply. It is known from other portions of Wilson's correspondence that he invited suggestions from other judicious Southern men also, but it is not known that their responses are preserved.

Though Wilson in the end supported all the Congressional measures of Reconstruction, he was never an extremist, and professed a strong desire to restore peaceable feelings between the sections. In a reply to Senator Nye, in March, he had said:

These states must continue, for ages to come, to be a part of our common country; and these people, their children, and their children's children, must continue to be our countrymen. I do not consider it either generous, manly, or Christian, to nourish or cherish or express feelings of wrath or hatred toward them. At this time, when these misguided and mistaken countrymen of ours have been conquered, when we have absolutely established our ideas, which must pervade and be incorporated into their system of public policy, it seems to me

to be a duty sanctioned by humanity and religion to heal the wounds of war.

Trescot's letter, by reason of the qualities noted above and of his well-known clearness of insight and expression, is of interest and value. It has recently been acquired by the Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts. To the chief of that division, Mr. Gailard Hunt, our thanks are due for permission to print.

HAZLEWOOD
NEAR PENDLETON
Sep. 8". 1867.

Dear Sir

Your letter of Sep. 1st reached me last night. I thank you for the courtesy which suggested it and the feeling of kindness to the State which it expresses. It encourages me to ask your serious attention to the critical condition of things with us.

I believe I represent the opinions of a majority of the white people of this State but it is a majority which the policy of the Republican Party as we understand or misunderstand it—you can best say which—has rendered entirely powerless for good.

The Supplemental Act¹ has greatly enlarged the catalogue of the disfranchised. By a general phrase, the full force of which I can hardly think that Congress intended, all those who are or have been engaged in executing a general law of the State, are disfranchised. As one illustration, this includes Commissioners of Roads, of the Poor, of Free Schools. Now in the Country Districts, there is not a neighbourhood in which the most respectable citizens, the very men holding the opinions which I have expressed and who would therefore form the nucleus of a wholesome public opinion, are not disfranchised. And when you consider that not only those who held such positions during the war but all those who have ever held them are disfranchised and the other fact that it has been the invariable custom to change these officers at the end of their terms, so that their onerous but unpaid service should not press too heavily upon one set of persons, you will readily understand how large a number are now included in the disfranchisement and how such wholesale destruction of the white vote, disheartens and deters the few who can, from registering.

While this process has been going on with the white vote—while the hard struggle for daily bread and the disfranchisement of those accustomed to direct public opinion, have prevented all concert among the whites, the blacks, who when they will work, are receiving good wages and who when they will not work are being supported by the Government, have been secretly and thoroughly organized by the Union League on the distinct basis of colour. No denial of this can avail against the evidence of our daily life and the fact that although in this and other Districts, the negroes have been invited to meet the whites in their public gatherings and to select their own speakers, they respond very coldly to such invitations. They prefer the secret association of the League and although we cannot of course speak positively as to the teaching of such associations, it is impossible not to conclude

¹ Act of July 19, 1867, section VI.

from conversation with such negroes as are disposed to be communicative, that they are firmly convinced that adhesion to the League will in some way, they do not exactly know how, secure them the possession of the land of the State. To argue against such an impression is idle, especially when the argument is made by the present land owner.

From many letters before me—all from men who have earnestly endeavoured to do their duty in a spirit of the completest justice to the freedman—I will send you two extracts from different but equally important Districts—Districts too in which there it not an overwhelming preponderance of coloured voters.

"The Freedmans Bureau, the school masters and all the Radical emissaries have had the field to themselves and *they have done their work.*"

"In this District there are six Union lodges, with nearly every negro voter in the District already members with a few whites, and they have recently inserted an addition to the oath taken—that they will not vote for a white man for any office and this amendment was suggested to the negroes by a white man."

The registration which is nearly completed shews a much smaller white vote and a much larger black vote than was anticipated. Even in Districts where the white population is numerically the largest, the extension of the Disfranchisement has seriously altered the proportions of the votes and judging from the returns so far it seems not improbable that the white vote will scarcely be more than a third of the whole vote of the State.

In this condition of things there are three parties, or as only one of them is organized, I ought perhaps to say, three opinions in this State.

1. Those with whom Governor Perry² oppose the call of the Convention provided for in the Reconstruction Act. I think this opposition injudicious and calculated to aggravate rather than cure the evils which it anticipates. But as a just man I am sure you will recognize that even this opposition proceeds not from an unwillingness to comply with the conditions of the Act as the expressed will of Congress but from the grave apprehension of the dangers which the condition of things I have described, seems to threaten.

2. Those who are represented as an organized party in the Coloured Convention lately held at Columbia.³ This party is composed almost entirely of the coloured citizens of the State, the white persons belonging to its organization being an almost imperceptible infusion. Its leaders with the exception of perhaps half a dozen intelligent and respectable native freedmen, are either coloured men from other States or the white holders of subordinate government offices here. I mean no disrespect to any of them when I state the fact that they are not either in property ability or character, representatives of the people of South Carolina. The policy of this party is declared in the platform which it has published and I do not think I misrepresent its intentions when I say that it is attempting to make its support of the Reconstruction Acts, the means of forcing upon the State negro supremacy and an agrarian domestic legislation.

² Benjamin Franklin Perry, provisional governor of South Carolina in 1865.

³ The convention of the Union Republican party, which met at Charleston May 9, and adjourned to meet at Columbia July 24. Three-fourths of its members were negroes.

3. But there is a third party (I use the word for convenience) in the State which is not organized. That party believes that the issues made in the late war, have been irrevocably decided against us—that the abolition of slavery is a great political and social revolution, the consequences of which may be directed with wisdom but cannot be prevented by resistance—that the Reconstruction Act is the settlement of the late disturbances, not that which we desired, but a settlement upon which the South can renew its regular political life—that most of its conditions which are harsh and felt to be unjust, proceed as much from ignorance and misconception of the public feeling and opinion of the South as from a deliberate intention to oppress—that Universal suffrage is a mistake but that if the North refuses to accept that impartial suffrage which reconciles the interest of the Country with the rights of the individual, the only way to correct the error is to teach the freedman how to discharge his duty and so to win his confidence that he will not desire to use his power against us.

The conditions of the political life of the South are completely changed. The relations of the States to the Federal Government will never be again what we thought they were under our old interpretation of the Constitution and the question of race or colour is forever excluded in the determination of political privileges. Whatever we may think as speculators on abstract political questions, these are the conditions of the new life the State must lead. What sort of future it will make we do not know. What the Republican party will do in the development of this new life either at home or abroad we cannot anticipate. In fairness, we think, that party cannot insist upon our taking part in national politics while we are denied national representation. It cannot call upon us to support a policy which it has not declared. But we do recognize its right to call upon us to close this strife upon fixed conditions, to accept the *facts* which it has established in virtue of success and so to prepare and fit the State for the full and free exercise of the powers to which we will be restored.

Holding these opinions, we who hold them, have urged upon such of our fellow citizens as could register, to secure their right to vote, to vote for the Convention, to elect as far as they could the best representatives who were qualified, and in the Convention to endeavour earnestly in a fair and just spirit to frame such a Constitution as would protect the rights of all without sacrificing the interests or character of the State.

But we are met by two difficulties. The minority which differs with us and is composed of men whose characters are above reproach, whose ability and influence are beyond question say to us—Your effort is hopeless. We desire peace as much as you do. We are as willing as you can be to restore our relations to the Union and do our duty to the whole country as obedient and faithful citizens, but look at the facts around you and say whether we will be allowed to do this without consenting and aiding to establish, not the equality of the negro before the law but his absolute supremacy.

On the other hand we find the black vote of the State united and organized, bound together by pass-words and secret oaths and directed by men whose only hope of power and profit is the perpetuation of this hostility between the races and who to perpetuate it, advocate legislation against all the established interests of society. To some, to a

large extent, universal suffrage has produced this state of things, but not entirely and more as a means than an end. For I will venture to say and in proof [of] the assertion I appeal to the letter of Gen Sickles⁴ to Senator Trumbull, to the recent report of Gen Scott, the Commissioner of the Freedmans Bureau for this State⁵ and to the experience of all, black and white, engaged in agriculture—that if the races were left to themselves under the controul which the present Milit[ar]y Government exerts or the impartial administration of the laws which a restored State Government would enforce, there would be no insuperable difficulty in the way of a complete understanding. The relations of black and white have been most kindly. Negro labour has been wanted, it has been well paid and as a general rule where judiciously directed, it has worked well and the causes of complaint on either side have diminished and are diminishing.

But it is equally undeniable that the natural influence of capital on labour, of employer on employed, that influence which in the development of civilization has always existed and must always exist in every society where public and private prosperity go hand in hand, has been utterly destroyed, that negroes who will trust their white employers in all their personal affairs, whose every day conduct manifests nothing but kindness, are entirely beyond advice or influence upon all political issues. And this is owing to the secret teaching of the Union League and to the claim made by its leaders that it is the Representative of the Republican party. It teaches the freedman to be quiet now because the Conventon will make him all powerful hereafter. It tells him that the Republican party means him to controul the white man and for that reason has given him a vote and taken it away from his white employer—that it means him to use his power of legislation to confiscate by taxation and thus secure lands which the party cannot give—that it pays the school master who teaches and the orator who excites him—that it has given him his freedom and the power to use it and that he will be untrue to himself and faithless to his benefactor, if he does not use it in his interest. Above all it impresses upon him the conviction that we, the white men of the South, are his natural enemies, that *you* so consider us and that you have deprived us of the commonest right of citizenship and made us aliens in our own homes for his protection.

Now it needs no prophet to predict the consequences of such a policy when put into active operation.

But these consequences are entirely unnecessary for the objects which the Republican party professes in its policy of Reconstruction. When the Reconstruction Acts shall have been executed and the Southern States restored, the Republican party will have ach[i]eved all that is positive in its creed. In the future there will be differences and divisions but they will be rather upon the application of principles than upon their truth. No party can live upon dead issues. No party which has a national policy can in the future desire to divide the black and white vote of the South by a line of colour. No such party can wish to assume before the country the responsibility for the confusion and

⁴ General Daniel E. Sickles, military commander, March 21–August 31, 1867, of the district made up of North and South Carolina.

⁵ Robert K. Scott, afterward "carpet bag" governor of the state, 1868–1872.

disorder (to use mild terms) which must inevitably follow such a distinction, for negro supremacy is one of those inventions which will surely return to plague the inventor.

You know—every man in this county, white and black, knows that this is in no invidious or offensive sense, but as a fact the white mans government. You and they know that the spirit of independence which settled it, the courage which won its liberty and has maintained its existence, the brain which devised its constitution, the enterprise which extended its territory, the capital which freights its ships, ploughs its fields, digs its mines and builds its railroads—the arts and the science, the effort and the achiev[e]ment which make the sum of its civilization, belong to the white man. This civilization you cannot intend, you cannot desire to destroy. But you cannot destroy it in ten States without deteriorating it in all. You cannot be more willing than we are that the freedman shall enjoy all its advantages, that he shall be made part and parcel of it in so far as he can contribute to its perfect development but in your interest and in ours, indeed in his own, he should not be permitted to endanger it, and that at the South this civilization is in danger I do not think the most sanguine can deny.

Remember this fact which you have recognized by your action. For two centuries we have held this people as slaves. Whatever may have been the inherent defects of the system, whatever may have been the shortcomings of those who administered it, we had in that time so improved the character and so developed the intelligence of the negro, that you, having the power, declared he should no longer be kept in this state of dependance but should be made a free citizen of the Country in which his life had become incorporated. We have acquiesced in your decision. But in carrying it out, perhaps I should say, in order to carry it out, you have taken them out of our hands, freed them from our controul and by your policy of disfranchisement and suffrage have destroyed that influence over them which the change in itself would not necessarily have disturbed, certainly not to such an extent. Further, by the system of Reconstruction, the Military Government of the Southern States, the Freedmans Bureau and those other agencies which altho strictly they are mere party instrumentalities, are yet in view of your Congressional power, even stronger than Government officials, you have undertaken to adjust their new relations and to direct their new power. Surely therefore upon you the responsibility of this crisis rests. We have too much at stake not to desire your success and I admit our obligations both as wise men and good citizens to render you all the assistance in our power in adjusting these relations so as to promote the best interests of the whole country. With some knowledge of the opinion and feeling of this State, with no slight acquaintance with its interests and condition, I think I can say honestly that we have endeavoured to do our duty in this respect and it is a cause of thankfulness that so far both white and black have by temperance and justice avoided the collision which seemed imminent. But I cannot be blind to the fact that the dangers and difficulties are increasing, that as the elections approach, the public mind—I refer to both white and black—is becoming excited and apprehensive—that vast power is placed under the controul of ignorance and passion, and that bad men are preparing to use it recklessly for selfish and sinister purposes.

These dangers and difficulties I have endeavoured to describe to you with no exaggeration and I am sure in no spirit of vindictive or even hostile criticism. We can do nothing, you can: for the influence which was once ours is now yours. Some things you cannot do for some things can never be undone. But there are two things in your power to do, both plain and practical, the meaning of which would be clear to the comprehension of the dullest voter in the land.

1. The organization of the black vote of this State upon the avowed and distinct basis of race and colour, which you have solemnly disavowed as a principle of the Republican party, is due and depends entirely upon the secret association of the Union League and its carefully concealed teaching. That League could not live a day without you—its strength is its undisputed claim to represent you. This claim you can disallow. You can teach the freedman that the freedom you have given him is that which walketh at noonday and not in the darkness—that the privileges which you have conferred upon him need no passport to admit him to their enjoyment, that the oath of allegiance to the Constitution is not a secret pledge of servile obedience and that the laws you make for the whole country are sufficient protection for all its citizens. You can teach him his duties as well as his rights, that he has been given the one in order that he may discharge the other, and that when you declared that the negro should no longer be a slave you did not mean that hereafter he should be master.

2. But to do this you must do another thing, you must relieve the disfranchisement which you have imposed. I do not mean to deny your right to impose disfranchisement as a punishment to the individual nor do I complain of its harshness. But this is not individual punishment. In this State at least, it is the destruction of society. It excludes, not from honours and offices the few whose ambition and influence you may hold responsible for the late civil war, but it shuts out from the discharge of all those civil duties which are necessary to the very existence of political society, the whole body of the capital, the experience, the intelligence and the character of the State. This may seem to you exaggeration, but if you will consider the unanimity of the white people of this State during the late war, the universal application of the disfranchising penalty which is the consequence, the complete almost absolute power which is given to the coloured population in the coming convention which must controul the Constitution to be framed, and which will scarcely be diminished in the succeeding legislative elections, I think you will admit that unity and organized action of the coloured vote of the State must result in the exclusion of the capital, wealth and intelligence which make the life and strength of society, from all participation in that government which controuls their interests and which really cannot exist without their support.

The freedmen themselves see and feel this. They see the white men upon whom they know they are still dependant for occupation whose capital runs the rail roads and keeps open the shops and pays the wages of their labour—deprived of the right to vote and excluded from the offices which they have always filled and if they cannot exactly comprehend the reason, they feel at least that you mean them to be distrusted. And the class so marked by you is so extensive that the negro is scarcely to blame for too large a generalization when he concludes that you mean to subordinate the white race to him, and that

you mean him to conduct the State Government which you have given him the power to controul.

Do not misunderstand me. I am not denying your power to disfranchise nor have I a word to say about "the magnanimity of a great government" etc. What I mean to say is simply this, that such a disfranchisement as you have applied to us, is the disorganization of the State and places the controul of the State in the hands of the freedmen. If that is your intention, then I have nothing more to say. You have effected it. But I do not believe it is your intention. In imposing this disfranchisement I believe you have looked too intently upon our relations to the Federal Government and have overlooked the fact that a penal policy which you thought liberal in its limited exclusion of certain classes from Federal honours and offices becomes a stringent and destructive policy when applied to State offices. If you wish these Southern States restored, you very naturally wish them to be restored with changed opinions and altered feelings but just as certainly you do not wish to receive them back with their State Governments utterly disorganized and their means of social and industrial prosperity completely destroyed. Now the United States Government may be administered strongly if not wisely with the exclusion of the disfranchised classes, but no State Government can be administered at all especially one where that disfranchisement covers all the influences which contribute to make public opinion, public wealth, public character.

But I have said enough. You have written to me kindly—the best return it seems to me which I can make is to write to you frankly. I need not tell you that I have endeavoured earnestly to reconcile and heal our differences upon the basis of your own settlement. I can say with equal truth that wiser and stronger and better men than I am are striving to do the same thing and that even those who differ as to the means desire the same end.

A truer word was never spoken—let me add, by a truer or better man, than when referring to the condition of the South at the time of Gen Lees surrender, Gen Hampton said,

"I have no hesitation in asserting that the Southern States would then have been brought back into the Union with more of 'loyalty'—to use a favourite expression of the North—than had existed among them for forty years past, had the North proved itself to be as magnanimous as it had shewn itself to be powerful".

I am afraid that you are making the same mistake now which you made then, that as you misunderstood then the spirit in which we accepted the consequences of Gen Lees surrender, so now you misunderstand the spirit in which we have accepted the conditions of the Reconstruction Act. For the party controversy and the passion which marked its passage we are not responsible and it ought not to be applied to us as a party measure to meet party exigencies.

I am aware that discussion—public discussion especially, can do no good—discussion is controversy and controversy is passion. What we—what the whole country wants is authority not argument.

But I have written to you earnestly and at this length because it seems probable that Congress will meet before the Reconstruction Acts are executed and that the condition of the South will naturally and necessarily occupy their attention. Your ability, your position, your professed and I believe sincere desire to restore the integrity of these

United States justify me in hoping that you will give calm, just, and wise consideration to such an effort as I have now made to place the truth of that condition before you

Respectfully

WM HENRY TRECOT

To Hon:

Henry Wilson

Let me say that this letter has been written simply to you and has been put in this shape⁶ only that the reading of so much Mss. might be as little troublesome to you as possible.

⁶ Twenty foolscap pages written on only one side of the paper, and stitched together at the top.